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# Off

**The House is likely to approve CIR now due to Obama’s push**

Matthews, 10/17

Laura Matthews, U.S. politics reporter for the International Business Times; “Immigration Reform 2013: ‘Finish The Job,’ Obama Tells Congress,” 10/17/2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/immigration-reform-2013-finish-job-obama-tells-congress-1430650 //bghs-ms

With the threat of a U.S. default lifted and the government reopened after a 16-day shutdown, President Barack Obama quickly shifted the focus of his domestic agenda, putting a 2013 immigration reform bill among his top three priorities.¶ The president outlined on Thursday three policy areas where he said **there is not only bipartisan agreement but also the real possibility of making immediate progress** to “make a difference in our economy.”¶ In addition to pursing a balanced budget and finding consensus on a farm bill, Obama urged Congress to finish the work started on comprehensive immigration reform. The momentum pro-reform advocates saw earlier this year died off with the fiscal fight that ended Wednesday night, but now the president thinks it can come back. ¶ “We should finish the job of fixing our broken immigration system,” Obama said at a White House conference on Thursday. “There is already a broad coalition across America that’s behind this effort of comprehensive immigration reform.”¶ The Senate passed its 2013 comprehensive immigration reform bill in June, which included an increase in border security and a 13-year path to citizenship for immigrants in the country without legal papers. However, House Republicans have said they will not act on that measure unless it is supported by a majority of their caucus.¶ “The majority of Americans thinks this is the right thing to do,” Obama said. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear ’em. Let’s start the negotiations.”¶ Obama encouraged lawmakers to not put off the problem for another year or longer.¶ “**This can and should get done by the end of this year**,” he said.¶ In response to the president's call for action on immigration reform, American’s Voice, a pro-reform group, said the principal question remains whether House Speaker John Boehner will act.¶ The group’s executive director, Frank Sharry, called Obama’s offer a “get-out-of-jail card” being presented to Boehner and “smart” House Republicans.¶ “Working with Democrats to pass reform will help the GOP rehabilitate their badly damaged brand; solve a huge political problem facing the GOP with respect to Latino, Asian and immigrant voters; and prove to the American people they can govern responsibly rather than recklessly,” Sharry said in a statement. “The window of opportunity is open now. The goal should be to move through the House in a way that leads to bicameral negotiations with the Senate this year and a bill to the president’s desk as soon as possible.”

**Infrastructure spending drains capital - escalates fights with GOP**

Tomasky ’11 (Newsweek/Daily Beast special correspondent Michael Tomasky is also editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas – Newsweek – September 19, 2011 – lexis)

Finally, Barack Obama found the passion. "Building a world-class transportation system is part of what made us an economic superpower," he thundered in his jobs speech on the evening of Sept. 8. "And now we're going to sit back and watch China build newer airports and faster railroads? At a time when millions of unemployed construction workers could build them right here in America?" Obama's urgency was rightly about jobs first and foremost. But he wasn't talking only about jobs when he mentioned investing in America--he was talking about our competitiveness, and our edge in the world. And it's a point he must keep pressing. In a quickly reordering global world, infrastructure and innovation are key measures of a society's seriousness about its competitive drive. And we're just not serious. The most recent infrastructure report card from the American Society of Civil Engineers gives the United States a D overall, including bleak marks in 15 categories ranging from roads (D-minus) to schools and transit (both D's) to bridges (C). The society calls for $2.2 trillion in infrastructure investments over the next five years. On the innovation front, the country that's home to Google and the iPhone still ranks fourth worldwide in overall innovation, according to the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), the leading think tank on such questions, which conducts a biannual ranking. But we might not be there for long. In terms of keeping pace with other nations' innovation investments--"progress over the last decade," as ITIF labels it--we rank 43rd out of 44 countries. What's the problem? It isn't know-how; this is still America. It isn't identifying the needs; they've been identified to death. Nor is it even really money. There are billions sitting around in pension funds, equity funds, sovereign wealth funds, just waiting to be spent. The problem--of course--is politics. The idea that the two parties could get together and develop bold bipartisan plans for massive investments in our freight-rail system--on which the pro-business multiplier effects would be obvious--or in expanding and speeding up broadband (it's eight times faster in South Korea than here, by the way) is a joke. Says New York University's Michael Likosky: "We're the only country in the world that is imposing austerity on itself. No one is asking us to do it." There are some historical reasons why. Sherle Schwenninger, an infrastructure expert at the New America Foundation, a leading Washington think tank, says that a kind of anti-bigness mindset developed in the 1990s, that era in which the besotting buzzwords were "Silicon Valley" and "West Coast venture capital." Wall Street began moving away from grand projects. "In that '90s paradigm, the New Economy-Silicon Valley approach to things eschewed the public and private sectors' working together to do big things," Schwenninger says. "That model worked for software, social media, and some biotech. But the needs are different today." That's true, but so is the simple point that the Republican Party in Washington will oppose virtually all public investment. The party believes in something like Friedrich von Hayek's "spontaneous order"--that is, get government off people's backs and they (and the markets they create) will spontaneously address any and all problems. But looking around America today, can anyone seriously conclude that this is working?

**PC is key**

McMorris-Santoro, 10/15

Evan McMorris-Santoro, political reporter for Buzzfeed; “Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next,” 10/15/2013, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for //bghs-ms

The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and **our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans**, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Po cir lls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

**Visa policy is dragging down US-India relations now – only CIR can reaffirm our alliance with India**

Zee News 12

[“Krishna, Hillary to discuss visa fee hike in NY”, October 1st, 2012, http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/krishna-hillary-to-discuss-visa-fee-hike-in-ny\_802978.html]

New York: The issue of US visa fee hike, which has hurt several Indian IT firms, is expected to come up for discussion when External Affairs Minister SM Krishna meets US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton here on Monday on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. India has "consistently" taken up the issue of the visa fee hike with the US and the issue will figure in talks between Krishna and Clinton, official sources said. The US had raised visa fee in 2010 to fund its enhanced costs on securing border with Mexico under the Border Security Act. Some of the top Indian companies TCS, Infosys, Wipro and Mahindra Satyam were affected by the US action and India is expected to soon seek consultations with the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the issue. The sources said that young Indian professionals working in the US have been the "cornerstone" of India-US relations and are a pillar in the improved bilateral relations that has brought the two countries closer. Hiking visa fees or limiting the number of work visas available to Indian companies is tantamount to "undermining that pillar and growth in India-US relations," they added. "Raising visa fees and putting other barriers is not in consonance with the forward thinking of growing bilateral ties," the sources said. This will be the third bilateral meeting between Krishna and Clinton this year. They had previously met in India in April and again in June in Washington. The sources said that the two countries have a fairly elaborate agenda and the visa issue is one of the issues in a broader relationship. Krishna will also address the 67th session of the UN General Assembly today. part of the world are essential to the peace and prosperity of the world.

**Solves laundry list of global conflicts – spills over and solves Asian power vacuum**

Armitage et al ’10[Richard is the President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State. R. Nicholas Burns is a Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Richard Fontaine is the President of the Center for New American Security. “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October, Center for New American Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Burns%20-%20Natural%20Allies.pdf]

A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided. The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation. The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List.¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power.¶ U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include:¶ • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.¶ • Strengthening an open global trad[e]ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ • Countering terrorism and violent extremism.¶ • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.¶ • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime.¶ • Promoting democracy and human rights.¶ • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia.¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually **all major global challenges**. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.

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**Text: The federal government of Mexico should provide all necessary funding to facilitate improved efficiency and reduced congestion along the U.S.-Mexico border.**

**Mexico can invest in infrastructure**

Bain 7/15 (Ben, Staff Writer, Bloomberg News, “Mexican Peso Rallies on Infrastructure Plan, Eased Fed Concern” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-15/mexican-peso-rallies-on-infrastructure-plan-eased-fed-concern.html/BB)

Mexico’s peso climbed to a one-month high as a U.S. retail slowdown eased concern that the Federal Reserve will curtail stimulus and President Enrique Pena Nieto announced a $315 billion infrastructure plan. The currency appreciated 1.2 percent to 12.6672 per U.S. dollar at 4 p.m. in Mexico City, the strongest closing level since June 13. The peso extended its advance this year to 1.5 percent, the only gain among 16 major dollar counterparts tracked by Bloomberg. Yields on benchmark peso bonds due in 2024 rose one basis point, or 0.01 percentage point, to 5.77 percent. “The more weak data that comes out, the market is going to speculate that the stimulus will last a little longer,” Ramon Cordova, a trader at Banco Base SA in San Pedro Garza Garcia, Mexico, said in a telephone interview. “It helps high-yielding currencies like the peso.” The peso has gained 1.8 percent since July 10, when Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said the U.S. needs “highly accommodative monetary policy for the foreseeable future.” Mexico’s currency tumbled 2.6 percent on June 19, when Bernanke said the U.S. central bank may begin to slow its $85 billion in monthly bond purchases this year and end them in 2014 if economic growth meets policy makers’ goals. The peso also advanced today as Pena Nieto said in Mexico City that the infrastructure plan includes investment by the government and private companies in energy and about $100 billion in communications and transportation projects such as new ports and rail lines.

# Off

The affirmative’s discourse of “failed states” legitimizes an interventionist epistemology that effaces difference, makes north-south inequality inevitable, and is self-fulfilling

Eisenträger 12 (Stian Eisenträger, MA student in IR, board member at International Reporter, a Norwegian NGO, 3-27-12, “Failed State or Failed Label?: The Concealing Concept and the Case of Somalia,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/failed-state-or-failed-label-the-concealing-concept-and-the-case-of-somalia/>) gz

The end of the Cold War shaped a new international political context where the issues of democracy and human rights were brought out from the internal to the external scene. The weakened role of the Soviet Union gave the United States the possibility to increase its global influence. In this context *the absence of effective government* emerged on the world political agenda together with the concept of the “failed state” (Akpinarli 2009). Boutros Boutros-Gali and Kofi Annan, the former Secretaries-General of the UN, used the “failed state” term as early as in 1990, although the General Assembly or the Security Council never used it. Somalia, which was a typical case of the absence of effective government, was described by the UN without the use of the term “failed state”. The concept was then applied for the first time in the article “Saving Failed States” published in the winter edition of Foreign Policy Magazine in 1992-1993 (Helman & Ratner). This article, which was written in the post-Cold War context with its high aspirations for democracy, human rights, the more active role of the United Nations in safeguarding collective security and the emergence of the United States’ as the leading agenda-setting actor, established the basic concept and the paradigm. Although some have tried to incorporate “failed states” in international law, the term is highly debated because of the neo-colonial notion attached to it (Akpinarli 2009, 87-89). According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word “fail” can have a range of different meanings: “to lose strength”, “to fade or die away”, “to stop functioning normally”, “to fall short”, “to be or become absent or inadequate”, “to be unsuccessful” and “to become bankrupt or insolvent” (Merriam-Webster 2011). Thus, I would argue that the word is too imprecise to be meaningful in our attempt to broaden our understanding of the world. In addition, the word is heavily value-laden and has loads of negative connotations attached to it, and therefore I find it unsuitable to use in science. That journalists and politicians still use the term, which is both catchy and tabloid, is understandable when we take into consideration the rather brutal limitations of time and space these two occupational groups have in their struggle to reach their audiences. Nevertheless, numbers of scholars have used and still use the failed state label, many even without engaging critically with the term (Bates 2008; Ghani & Lockhart 2008; Holzgrefe & Keohane 2003, just to mention a few). The urge to “fix”: Securitization and intervention The failed state paradigm implies that there is something that needs to be “fixed” or “saved” – of course by “good” liberal democratic external forces. “Preventing states from failing, and rescuing those that do fail, are (…) strategic and moral imperatives”, Robert I. Rotberg (2002) proclaims in an article with the dramatic title “Failed States in a World of Terror” (the argument is elaborated in his book, bearing the same title). One can feel the notion of “the white mans burden”. One of the most neoliberal contributions in the failed states debate is probably that of Ashraf Ghani & Clare Lockhart (2008, 124) who in their book “Fixing failed states” boldly declare that “today states must fulfil their citizens’ aspirations for inclusion and development and also carry out a constellation of interrelated functions”. They conclude that states “in the world today” should perform ten key functions, which are: 1) Rule of law; 2) A monopoly of the legitimate means of violence; 3) Administrative control; 4) Sound management of public finances; 5) Investments in human capital; 6) Creation of citizenship rights through social policy; 7) Provision of infrastructure services; 8) Formation of a market; 9) Management of public assets; 10) Effective public borrowing. So now when we have the list, can we just go out in the world and start “fixing”? Fixing “failed states” is a dangerous exercise: For many policymakers the failed state label contributes to open up for and make a good excuse for military and other interventions. Petra Minnerop shows how the US throughout the second half of the 20th century developed several terms, for example “rogue states”, for “states to which it ascribed a high threat potential as regards the United States and international security” (2003). In the years to follow after the 1992 article in Foreign Policy Magazine the international community, with the US in the leading role, carried out military interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq on the basis that the chaotic situation in these states poses a threat to the US and international security in general. The terms “failed state”, “rogue state” and “war on terror” have all been given prominent roles in the public debate. As Akpinarli also remarks, these concepts have been invented by the North to “solve” problems in the South, as well as to advocate for and justify military interventions to protect international peace and security (Akpinarli 2009). I would argue that the concept rather causes more trouble than it solves – not only in terms of military intervention, but also by keeping “failed” states in the margins of international relations. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the labelling of “failed states” is a prime example of what the Copenhagen School of Security has dubbed *securitization*. The founding fathers of this concept point out that “a discourse that takes form of presenting something to an existential threat to the referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a *securitizing move*, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). The audience – in this instance, ordinary citizens in the North – has to a large extent accepted the “failed state” paradigm, especially with reference to Somalia. Both the media and the large organizations working with/in/for the “failed state” are acting as agents for the securitizing actors – that is the governments in the North, especially the United States’ government. Somalia has been among the top five on the list since the first Failed States Index was published in 2005, and since 2008 Somalia has had the dubious honour of being the world’s “most failed state”. Whether it is possible to measure a state’s “failure” is a question that probably requires a book to be answered. Since 2005 the magazine and Fund for Peace have ranked the world’s countries after measuring the following variables: Demographic pressures, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention (Fund for Peace 2011). No doubt that all these measurements may give a good indicator of how the situation is in a number of countries. However, my point and critique is that the index fails in grasping the vast empirical variations within the research object itself in the case of Somalia. Using the juridical state of Somalia as the object of analysis without looking under the surface becomes a serious hindrance of capturing the full picture. Somalia’s image problem As Michael C. Williams (2003, 527) excellently points out, “Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics”. In this context we can identify the visualization of the verbal rhetoric of the failed state paradigm. The presentation of ”failed states” is often accompanied with depictions of a war-torn hell-hole, and the Foreign Policy Magazine takes the lead by presenting the Failed States Index together with a collection of photos appearing under the splash heading: “Postcards from Hell” (Foreign Policy Magazine 2011). When the Failed States Index is referred to by other news outlets, this kind of presentation is reproduced (for a recent example, see: BBC 2011a). I have yet to see an example of any media organization to examine the Index more closely. Only telling one side of the story is a serious problem. We can compare the use of the “failed state” label with how Somalia is depicted in the daily media coverage. How many times can you remember to have seen the pictures from Somalia, the disaster zone, with starving children, heavily armed Islamist fighters and dead people being dragged through the streets by a cheering mob? Quite a few times, I suppose. On the other hand, how many times have you seen pictures from Somalia showing farmers working in their fields, smiling and playful children, or the beach in Mogadishu crowded with both men, women and children? Probably not at all. Of course, the pictures of the disaster zone of Somalia are real and by every journalistic standard it is right to publish such pictures. The practice becomes a problem when these are the only pictures that are being shown, when the stories about starving children and dangerous terrorists are the only stories that are being told about Somalia outside Somalia. This misrepresentation in the media can for a large part be attributed to the “failed state” label that is burn-marked on the country, and which pay so little attention to the variations within the geographical area that makes up the state of Somalia. When a statement is repeated enough times, it becomes a “truth”. Politicians and scholars, as well as the media itself are responsible for this brand marking, and the process is self-reinforcing. The situation has reached the point where members of the Somali diaspora community in Norway has established an organization with one of its main goals to adjust the picture that has been made of Somalia and the Somali people (Iftiin – somalisk-norsk kunnskapssenter 2011). Somalia has a serious image-problem – literally. Not only does this put the country in risk of external intervention, it also contributes to keep Somalia and much of its population in the margins of international relations. There is a lack of representation of the people inhabiting the territory of the Somali Republic, both because the TFG lacks authority, but also because of the non-recognition of the de facto states of Somaliland and Puntland. Here we have to functional geopolitical entities that are not represented in the UN nor in other global or regional institutions. Furthermore foreign investors and tourists stay away because of the perception and understanding of the whole of Somalia being a ”failed state”. Africaand the Knowledge of Non-Being In his classic work Orientalism, Edward Said (2003 [1978]) scrutinize the history and nature of Western attitudes towards the East. He argues that orientalism is a powerful European ideological creation and a way for dealing with the “otherness” of Eastern culture, customs and beliefs. Achille Mbembe applies much of the same argumentation in his critique of Africanism. He says that historically, the West has constructed its own civilization, enlightenment and progress through the “others”, thus non-Western cultures, and especially Africa. Mbembe argues that: “Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and still continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world” (Mbembe 2001, 2). One of the challenges in grasping how things work outside the Western world is that many, if not even all, of the concepts we use when describing the universe of International Relations is based in Western history and thinking. Max Weber’s famous definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber et al. 1991, 78). In Western thinking, Weber’s definition represents the *idea* of an “ideal state”, and it seems like many have the perception that Western states fit into this idea or norm. When analyzing states in Africa, this is revealed when African states are compared with the *idea* of an “ideal state”, which is believed to be a prototype of a Western state – leading to the focus on African states’ absences, lacks and incompleteness, as weak or failed. In this way Mbembe’s analysis is straight to the point when he states that “while we feel we know nearly everything that African states, societies, and economies *are not*, we still know absolutely nothing about *what they actually are*”. Our knowledge of Africa is to a large degree based on the knowledge of non-being (Mbembe 2001, 9). But claiming that the “Western state” resembles the Weberian state, or even that the “Western state” is the norm, is highly problematic. First of all, every state has its own specific features, and the higher the degree of generalization, the more problematic it is. Secondly, Weber’s state is an idea of a state that has never existed in practice – even not in Europe or North America – for example when we take into account the important fact that private violence and private security has existed through modern history, and even today. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010), Colás & Mabee (2010) and Thomson (1994) are among several scholars who have demonstrated how private violence and private security takes form in e.g. private companies, criminal organizations and vigilante groups. If the states in Europe and North America are to be judged by the same standards as the states in Africa, many of these could get the “failed” label as well. Noam Chomsky, for example, has turned the tables in his book “Failed States”, where he shows that the US shares features with other “failed states” (2007). But does the “failed state” label provide us with more and better insight into how different states work; does it enlighten us in any way? Definitely not. The label conceals more than it enlightens. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010) argues that we must look beyond the state when analysing security issues in Africa. I would argue that we must look both beyond and within the state also when we want to analyse states in Africa, and especially Somalia.

Alternative text: Affirm the plan absent the 1ac’s failed state justifications

Rejecting their discourse is key to contest their imperial myths

Hill 2k5 [jonathon, beyond the other? a postcolonial critique of the failed state thesis, african identities, vol 3, no 42, p139-154, lecturer in defense studies at joint services command and staff college]

Since the late 1980s, descriptions of African states as weak, quasi, failed and collapsed have become increasingly commonplace within the discipline of International Relations (IR). Such descriptions stress the supposed weaknesses and inabilities of African states compared to those of Western Europe and North America, and are made by academic writers whose works contribute to the growing body of literature dedicated to examining state failure. Despite differences between these works in focus and emphasis, they are united by a variety of shared assumptions.1 Drawing on insights gained from postcolonial studies,2 this article argues that, similar to the European colonisers of Africa of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, failed state analysts constitute the identities of African societies (failed and non-failed alike) in relation to Western societies, attributing negative characteristics to the former and positive to the latter. Moreover, again like the European colonisers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, failed state analysts use the alleged deviancy of African societies to promote and justify their political and economic domination by Western states and other international actors. This article challenges the failed state thesis by calling for a rejection of such terms as weak state, quasi state, failed state and collapsed state. This constitutes not simply a rejection of a particular set of labels which are applied to African states, but of the continued positioning of African states and societies as the deviant Other to those of Western Europe and North America.¶ Toward that end the article is divided into two main sections. The first part outlines what insights this article derives from postcolonial studies. To be clear, it is not being claimed that the understanding of postcolonial studies posited here is definitive. Neither is it being argued that no insights other than the ones outlined can be derived from postcolonial studies. Rather this article posits an understanding of postcolonialism and draws on only those insights relevant and useful to the task it has set itself. The second part provides an overview of the failed state thesis focusing in particular on the understanding of the state adopted by most state failure analysts and their comparative approach to identifying so-called failed states. The article concludes that only by abandoning such terms as weak state, quasi state, failed state and collapsed state can representations of African states and societies as imperfect copies of West European and North American states be countered.

# Case

## Inherency

**The *21st Century Border Management Joint Declaration* solves the aff – ensures regional trade competitiveness**

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Trade is an important tool in policymakers’ economic development toolbox. Ever since the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and given the complementarity of the U.S. and Mexican economies, bilateral trade has grown exponentially, reaching a record high of nearly $400 billion in 2010. Mexico is now the third-ranked commercial partner of the U.S. and the second largest market for U.S. exports. Mexico spent $163 billion on U.S. goods in 2010, and trade with Mexico sustains six million jobs in the U.S. This is economic value that for many in the U.S. remains “hidden in plain sight.” To provide a better idea of what this commercial partnership means to our country, U.S. sales to Mexico are larger than all U.S. exports to the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) combined, as well as all combined sales to Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Twenty-two states count Mexico as their No. 1 or No. 2 export market, and it is a top-five market for 14 other states. American consumers and businesses import large quantities of jointly produced products and services from Mexico such as automobiles, produce, and petroleum, just to name a few. Still, for every dollar Mexico makes from exporting to the U.S., it will in turn spend 50 cents on U.S. products or services, which are a considerable benefit to our economy and demonstrates the truly unique quality of this trade or “joint production” relationship. U.S.-Mexico Border Management: Building the Infrastructure for Future Competitiveness Sharing a 2,000-mile long border with Mexico needs to be recognized as both a challenge and an opportunity. Though improving, our border’s current infrastructure and capacity today reflect the needs of a bygone era. While land ports of entry between the two nations were first envisioned to process the legitimate crossing of people, goods and services across the border, security has taking an overwhelmingly dominant role in recent years, hampering the ability of agencies to efficiently manage border traffic. With this in mind, in May of 2010 the U.S. and Mexico signed the 21st Century Border Management Joint Declaration. Recognizing the importance of fostering the commercial relationship, both countries have agreed to coordinate efforts to enhance economic competitiveness by expediting lawful trade. The basic idea is that developing a modern and secure border infrastructure will give an added boost to our region’s safety and competitiveness in the world.

## Manu

**Squo solves manufacturing**

**Ignatius 12** (David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. Ignatius joined The Post in 1986 as editor of its Sunday Outlook section. In 1990 he became foreign editor, and in 1993, assistant managing editor for business news. He began writing his column in 1998 and continued even during a three-year stint as executive editor of the International Herald Tribune in Paris. Earlier in his career, Ignatius was a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, covering at various times the steel industry, the Justice Department, the CIA, the Senate, the Middle East and the State Department. Ignatius grew up in Washington, D.C., and studied political theory at Harvard College and economics at Kings College, Cambridge., 5/4/2012, "An economic boom ahead?", www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-economic-boom-ahead/2012/05/04/gIQAbj5K2T\_story.html)

Energy security would be one building block of a new prosperity. The other would be the revival of U.S. manufacturing and other industries. This would be driven in part by the low cost of electricity in the United States, which West forecasts will be relatively flat through the rest of this decade, and one-half to one-third that of economic competitors such as Spain, France or Germany. The coming manufacturing recovery is the subject of several studies by the Boston Consulting Group. I’ll focus here on the most recent one, “U.S. Manufacturing Nears the Tipping Point,” which appeared in March. What’s happening, according to BCG, is a “reshoring” back to America of manufacturing that previously migrated offshore, especially to China. The analysts estimate that by 2015, China’s cost advantage will have shrunk to the point that many **manufacturers will prefer to open plants in the United States**. In the vast manufacturing region surrounding Shanghai, total compensation packages will be about 25 percent of those for comparable workers in low-cost U.S. manufacturing states. But given higher American productivity, effective labor costs will be about 60 percent of those in America — not low enough to compensate U.S. manufacturers for the risks and volatility of operating in China. In about five years, argue the BCG economists, the cost-risk balance will reach an inflection point in seven key industries where manufacturers had been moving to China: computers and electronics, appliances and electrical equipment, machinery, furniture, fabricated metals, plastics and rubber, and transportation goods. The industries together amounted to a nearly $2 trillion market in the United States in 2010, with China producing about $200 billion of that total. As **manufacturers in these “tipping point” industries move back to America**, BCG estimates, the U.S. economy will add $80 billion to $120 billion in annual output, and 2 million to 3 million new jobs, in direct manufacturing and spin-off employment. **To complete this rosy picture, the analysts forecast that in about five years, U.S. exports will increase by at least $65 billion annually**. Hold on, Dr. Pangloss. Those are just economists’ estimates. What do real manufacturers say? Well, BCG has some new numbers on that, too. In April, the consulting firm released a survey of executives at 106 U.S.-based companies with annual sales of more than $1 billion. Thirty-seven percent of them said they were planning to reshore manufacturing operations or “actively considering” the move. Among larger companies with sales of more than $10 billion, the positive response rose to 48 percent. Talking about American decline has become a national sport among policy intellectuals. The country still has severe political problems, but the numbers in these new studies make me wonder if some of the deep pessimism is misplaced.

**But they can’t solve manufacturing – CX proves they can’t solve the issue they find with current manufacturing which is innovation.**

**Manufacturing loss doesn’t matter – services will sustain our competitiveness**

**Thompson 12** (Derek Thompson is a senior editor at The Atlantic, where he oversees business coverage for the website., 3/9/2012, "Trade My Brain, Please! Why We Don't Need to 'Make Something' to Export It", [www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/trade-my-brain-please-why-we-dont-need-to-make-something-to-export-it/254274/](http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/trade-my-brain-please-why-we-dont-need-to-make-something-to-export-it/254274/))

The president is onto something. Exports matter. A good reason to fetishize manufacturing is right in the president's first line: "If we do stuff here, we can sell it there." As you might have caught on, I changed the word "make" in the president's speech to "do" in this paragraph, because **we don't need to make something and put it in a box to sell it to foreigners**. We can do stuff and sell it for foreign money, too. This sort of thing is called a "service exports." It means selling our work, or brains, and our resources to other countries. "Services exports" sounds like a rather silly or impossible thing -- like putting an American doctor in a small box, shipping him across the Pacific to hospital in Mumbai, and shipping him back with the rupees. In fact, services exports are much simpler than that. Simpler, even, than selling actual manufactured goods. If an Argentinian student goes to Harvard, that's an export. If a Korean uses a Kansas architect to design a building, that's an export. If Bain Capital advises a British investor getting in on a Moroccan start-up, that's an export. Perhaps service exports seem less "pure" than manufactured exports. In fact, there's a better case that the opposite is true. For any given "export dollar," service exports create a great share of what economists call "U.S. value added. That's a mouth-full, so you can call it "cold hard money in America." Think about a car shipped in a box from the United States to Spain. That's a U.S. export. But it's not a 100% U.S. product. The car parts might have come from one country, where they were fixed in Canada, taken south to be assembled in the United States, and shipped to Barcelona. The money made from the Spanish sale counts as a U.S. export, but the revenue is divided across the car's global supply chain. On the other hand, if a Barcelona family goes to Detroit for vacation, their euros stay in Detroit. "Business service exports had 95.6 percent U.S. value-added in 2004," the Brookings Metropolitan Policy program reported in a new study on exports. "Metropolitan areas specialized in services, such as Des Moines, Las Vegas, and Washington, D.C. tend to have higher shares of U.S. value-added in their exports than the rest of the largest 100 metro areas." The United States is the second or third largest total exporter, by various counts. But as a service exporter, we're the unambiguous world leader, commanding 14% of the world market, twice that of second-place Germany. In 2010, private services exports represented a third of U.S. exports, according to Brookings, and that number is going to keep growing. (As Scott Thomasson pointed out on Twitter, we even have a trade surplus with China.) An emphasis on exports is important because it keeps us competitive in a global market and brings in foreign money, which is especially useful for a slow economy. But we shouldn't just think of exports as stuff we can put into a box. We will continue to make things and put them in boxes and sell them in other countries. But 70% of the economy is employed in the services sector and **there are five times more people working in professional services**/education/leisure&hospitality **than manufacturing today, and the ratio will probably grow in the next decade**. We need to talk about those exporting industries, too. You don't need to make something to sell it "there."

**Multipolarity coming in the status quo – retrenchment now is key to stable transition and cooperation**

**Zakaria, 12** (Fareed Zakaria, host of CNN’s flagship international affairs program, Editor at Large of TIME, Washington Post columnist and bestselling author; “The post-American world demands a new approach from the U.S.”, 2/1/2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-post-american-world-demands-a-new-approach-from-the-us/2012/02/01/gIQAba5ziQ\_story.html?hpid=z3)

Dear Mitt Romney, Congratulations on Florida. Now that you are again the front-runner, and your campaign focus is returning to President Obama, I’d like to call attention to a line you have used repeatedly: “This is a president who fundamentally believes that this next century is the post-American century.” I leave it to the president to describe what he believes, but as the author of the book “The Post-American World,” let me make sure you know what exactly you are attacking. “This is a book not about the decline of America but rather about the rise of everyone else,” I note at the very outset. I am optimistic about America, convinced that it can prosper in this new world and remain the most powerful country on the planet. But I argue that the age of American unipolarity — which began with the collapse of the Soviet Union — has ended. For a quarter-century after the collapse of communism, the United States dominated the world with no real political or economic competitors. Its ideas and its model — the Washington consensus — became received wisdom everywhere. Today we are in a different era. In 1990, China represented 2 percent of global gross domestic product. It has quadrupled, to 8 percent, and is rising. By most estimates, China’s economy will become the world’s largest between 2016 and 2018. This is not simply an economic story. China’s military capacity and reach are expanding. Since 2008 Chinese naval fleets have escorted more than 4,300 ships through the Gulf of Aden. Beijing’s defense spending is likely to surpass America’s by 2025. For its foreign policy activism, look on any continent: A gleaming new African Union headquarters was unveiled in Addis Ababa, Ethi­o­pia, last week. The $200 million-plus complex was financed by China and inaugurated by a high-ranking Politburo member, who arrived with a check for $94 million. It is not just China that is rising. Emerging powers on every continent have achieved political stability and economic growth and are becoming active on the global stage. Twenty years ago Turkey was a fragile democracy, dominated by its army, that had a weak economy constantly in need of Western bailouts. Today, Turkey has a trillion-dollar economy that grew 6.6 percent last year. Since April 2009, Turkey has created 3.4 million jobs — more than the European Union, Russia and South Africa put together. That might explain Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s confidence and his country’s energetic foreign policy. Look in this hemisphere: In 1990, Brazil was emerging from decades of dictatorship and was wracked by inflation rates that reached 3,000 percent. Its president was impeached in 1992. Today, the country is a stable democracy, steadily growing with foreign-exchange reserves of $350 billion. Its foreign policy has become extremely active. President Dilma Rousseff is in Cuba this week, “marking Brazil’s highest-profile bid to transform its growing economic might into diplomatic leadership in Latin America,” the Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday. Brazil’s state development bank is financing a $680 million rehabilitation of Cuba’s port at Mariel. For three decades, India was unable to get any Western country to accept its status as a nuclear power. But as its economy boomed and Asia became the new cockpit of global affairs, the mood shifted. Over the past five years the United States, France, Britain and others have made a massive exception for New Delhi’s nuclear program and have assiduously courted India as a new ally. I could go on. This is a new world, very different from the America-centric one we got used to over the last generation. Obama has succeeded in preserving and even enhancing U.S. influence in this world precisely because he has recognized these new forces at work. He has traveled to the emerging nations and spoken admiringly of their rise. He replaced the old Western club and made the Group of 20 the central decision-making forum for global economic affairs. By emphasizing multilateral organizations, alliance structures and international legitimacy, he got results. It was Chinese and Russian cooperation that produced tougher sanctions against Iran. It was the Arab League’s formal request last year that made Western intervention in Libya uncontroversial. By and large, you have ridiculed this approach to foreign policy, arguing that you would instead expand the military, act unilaterally and talk unapologetically. That might appeal to Republican primary voters, but chest-thumping triumphalism won’t help you secure America’s interests or ideals in a world populated by powerful new players. You can call this new century whatever you like, but it won’t change reality. After all, just because we call it the World Series doesn’t make it one.

**Attempts to postpone hegemonic decline fail and cause China war**

**Layne, 12** (Christopher Layne, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, JD from the University of Southern California Law Center, LLM in international law from the University of Virginia Law School, Mary Julia and George R Jordan professor of international affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, former associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami, former fellow in the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at the University of California Los Angeles, former fellow at the CATO Institute, former fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, former MacArthur Foundation fellow in global security, former visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, former research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University, former member of the professional staff at the Arroyo Center at the California Institute of Technology, former foreign policy analyst for NATO, 2012, “This Time it’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/pdf, published in International Studies Quarterly, volume 56)

What effect will China’s rise—and unipolarity’s concomitant end—and the United States’ internal economic and fiscal troubles have on the Pax Americana? Not much, according to prominent scholars such as Ikenberry (2001, 2011), Zakaria (2008), and Brooks and Wohlforth (2008). They have argued that the United States can cushion itself against any future loss of hegemony by acting now to “lock in” the Pax Americana’s essential features—its institutions, rules, and norms—so that they outlive unipolarity.11 As Ikenberry puts it, the United States should act today to put in place an institutional framework “that will safeguard our interests in future decades when we will not be a unipolar power” (Ikenberry 2011:348). This is not a persuasive argument. First, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige and soft power, on the other. The ebbing of the United States’ hegemony raises the question of whether it has the authority to take the lead in reforming the post-1945 international order. The Pax Americana projected the United States’ liberal ideology abroad, and asserted its universality as the only model for political, economic, and social development. Today, however, the American model of free market, liberal democracy—which came to be known in the 1990s as the Washington consensus—is being challenged by an alternative model, the Beijing consensus (Halper 2010). Moreover, the Great Recession discredited America’s liberal model. Consequently, it is questionable whether the United States retains the credibility and legitimacy to spearhead the revamping of the international order. As Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf says, “The collapse of the western financial system, while China’s flourishes, marks a humiliating end to the ‘unipolar moment.’ As western policy makers struggle, their credibility lies broken. Who still trusts the teachers?” (Wolf 2009). The second reason a US lock-in strategy is unlikely to succeed is because the United States does not have the necessary economic clout to revitalize the international order. Ikenberry defines the task of securing lock-in as “renewing and rebuilding the architecture of global governance and cooperation to allow the United States to marshal resources and tackle problems along a wide an shifting spectrum of possibilities” (Ikenberry 2011:353) To do this, the United States will need to take the lead in providing public goods: security, economic leadership, and a nation building program of virtually global dimension to combat the “socioeconomic backwardness and failure that generate regional and international instability and conflict” (Ikenberry 2011:354, 359). At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States had the material capacity to furnish the international system with public goods. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, a financially strapped United States increasingly will be unable to be a big time provider of public goods to the international order.12 The third reason the post-World War II international order cannot be locked in is the rise of China (and other emerging great and regional powers). The lock-in argument is marred by a glaring weakness: if they perceive that the United States is declining, the incentive for China and other emerging powers is to wait a decade or two and reshape the international system themselves in a way that reflects their own interests, norms, and values (Jacques 2009). China and the United States have fundamental differences on what the rules of international order should be on such key issues as sovereignty, non-interference in states’ internal affairs, and the “responsibility to protect.” While China has integrated itself in the liberal order to propel its economic growth, it is converting wealth into hard power to challenge American geopolitical dominance. And although China is working “within the system” to transform the post-1945 international order, it also is laying the foundations—through embryonic institutions like the BRICs and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—for constructing an alternative world order that, over the next twenty years or so, could displace the Pax Americana. As Martin Jacques has observed, China is operating “both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it” (Jacques 2009:362). Great power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in vacuum. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. The post-World War II international order is an American order that privileges the United States’ interests. Even the discourse of “liberal order” cannot conceal this fact. This is why the notion that China can be constrained by integrating into the post-1945 international order lacks credulity. For US scholars and policymakers alike, China’s successful integration hinges on Beijing’s willingness to accept the Pax Americana’s institutions, rules, and norms. In other words, China must accept playing second fiddle to the United States. Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington “to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia” (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding Sino-American rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: “This town ain’t big enough for both of us”) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

**Extinction**

**Cheong,** **2k** (Ching Cheong, Senior Writer at the Strait Times; “No one gains in a war over Taiwan,” June 25th, Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China, 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.

**Unipolarity makes backlash inevitable**

**Fiammenghi, 11** (Davide Fiammenghi, postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics, Institutions, History at the University of Bologna; “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics,” Spring 2011, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00037)

Beyond a certain point, the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish. This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations, on the one hand, and relations with enemies and neutrals, on the other. When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression, its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful. Meanwhile, the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger. At some point, the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. In the meantime, neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality, especially if one side should defeat the other, leaving them with little choice but submission. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies, and some will leave the alliance. The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals, which acquire new energy. Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point, where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals, leaving the aspiring hegemon **less secure** than before. A parabola nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. Beyond that threshold, power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly, because they thought in terms of absolute, not relative, power.30 Obviously, there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all. The concept must be understood in a relative sense, so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts.

**Data disproves their heg impacts**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

**Prolif decreases the risk of war—robust statistical, empirical evidence proves.**

Asal and Beardsley 7 (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” 44:2, Sage)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that **nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior**, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors—Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992)—and five nuclear actors—Gulf War (1990)—only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors—by extension, many general actors as well—experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. **All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities**. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), **it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons** can serve as a **deter**rent of **aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents**.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. **Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved**. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the outcomes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While dyadyear datasets have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of this analysis. If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent. Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study.

**Deterrence failure is very unlikely. Proliferation saves far more lives than it costs.**

Preston 7 (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR—Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate—Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 31-32)

1.) The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, **it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur** (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters — whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions —none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that **these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars**. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through nonnuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in **favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars**, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3 Further, as Gray (1999, 158-59) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that **have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior** (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

## Border Coop

**No impact to failed states – star this card!**

**Patrick**, senior fellow, director – program on international institutions and global governance @ CFR, 4/15/**’11**

(Stewart M, “Why Failed States Shouldn’t Be Our Biggest National Security Fear,” <http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/why-failed-states-shouldnt-our-biggest-national-security-fear/p24689>)

In truth, while **failed states** may be worthy of America's attention on humanitarian and development grounds, most of them **are irrelevant to** U.S. **national security.** The risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers seeking to prioritize scarce attention and resources. In 2008, I collaborated with Brookings Institution senior fellow Susan E. Rice, now President Obama's permanent representative to the United Nations, on an index of state weakness in developing countries. The study ranked all 141 developing nations on 20 indicators of state strength, such as the government's ability to provide basic services. More recently, I've examined whether these rankings reveal anything about each nation's role in major global threats: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime and infectious disease. **The findings are** startlingly **clear.** Only a handful of the world's failed states pose security concerns to the United States. Far greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries that may suffer from corruption and lack of government accountability but come nowhere near qualifying as failed states. The link between failed states and transnational terrorism, for instance, is tenuous. Al-Qaeda franchises are concentrated in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia but are markedly absent in most failed states, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Why? From a terrorist's perspective, the notion of finding haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. Al-Qaeda discovered this in the 1990s when seeking a foothold in anarchic Somalia. In intercepted cables, operatives bemoaned the insuperable difficulties of working under chaos, given their need for security and for access to the global financial and communications infrastructure. Al-Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as Kenya, where sovereignty provides some protection from outside interdiction. Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries for terrorism not only because they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch sustained counterterrorism operations against militants whom they value for other purposes. Terrorists also need support from local power brokers and populations. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al-Qaeda finds succor in the Pashtun code of pashtunwali, which requires hospitality to strangers, and in the severe brand of Sunni Islam practiced locally. Likewise in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has found sympathetic tribal hosts who have long welcomed mujaheddin back from jihadist struggles. Al-Qaeda has met less success in northern Africa's Sahel region, where a moderate, Sufi version of Islam dominates. But as the organization evolves from a centrally directed network to a diffuse movement with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, it is as likely to find haven in the banlieues of Paris or high-rises of Minneapolis as in remote Pakistani valleys. What about failed states and weapons of mass destruction? Many U.S. analysts worry that poorly governed countries will pursue nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons; be unable to control existing weapons; or decide to share WMD materials. These fears are misplaced. With two notable exceptions — North Korea and Pakistan — the world's weakest states pose minimal proliferation risks, since they have limited stocks of fissile or other WMD material and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries (say, Iran and Syria) intent on pursuing WMD, corrupt nations (such as Russia) that possess loosely secured nuclear arsenals and poorly policed nations (try Georgia) through which proliferators can smuggle illicit materials or weapons. When it comes to crime, the story is more complex. Failed states do dominate production of some narcotics: Afghanistan cultivates the lion's share of global opium, and war-torn Colombia rules coca production. The tiny African failed state of Guinea-Bissau has become a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe. (At one point, the contraband transiting through the country each month was equal to the nation's gross domestic product.) And Somalia, of course, has seen an explosion of maritime piracy. Yet failed states have little or no connection with other categories of transnational crime, from human trafficking to money laundering, intellectual property theft, cyber-crime or counterfeiting of manufactured goods. Criminal networks typically prefer operating in functional countries that provide baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities. They also accept higher risks to work in nations straddling major commercial routes. Thus narco-trafficking has exploded in Mexico, which has far stronger institutions than many developing nations but borders the United States. South Africa presents its own advantages. It is a country where “the first and the developing worlds exist side by side,” author Misha Glenny writes. “The first world provides good roads, 728 airports . . . the largest cargo port in Africa, and an efficient banking system. . . . The developing world accounts for the low tax revenue, overstretched social services, high levels of corruption throughout the administration, and 7,600 kilometers of land and sea borders that have more holes than a second-hand dartboard.” Weak and failing African states, such as Niger, simply **cannot compete.** Nor do failed states pose the greatest threats of pandemic disease. Over the past decade, outbreaks of SARS, avian influenza and swine flu have raised the specter that fast-moving pandemics could kill tens of millions worldwide. Failed states, in this regard, might seem easy incubators of deadly viruses. In fact, recent fast-onset pandemics have bypassed most failed states, which are relatively isolated from the global trade and transportation links needed to spread disease rapidly. Certainly, the world's weakest states — particularly in sub-Saharan Africa — suffer disproportionately from disease, with infection rates higher than in the rest of the world. But their principal health challenges are endemic diseases with local effects, such as malaria, measles and tuberculosis. While U.S. national security officials and Hollywood screenwriters obsess over the gruesome Ebola and Marburg viruses, outbreaks of these hemorrhagic fevers are rare and self-contained. I do not counsel complacency. The world's richest nations have a moral obligation to bolster health systems in Africa, as the Obama administration is doing through its Global Health Initiative. And they have a duty to ameliorate the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, which continues to ravage many of the world's weakest states. But poor performance by developing countries in preventing, detecting and responding to infectious disease is often shaped less by budgetary and infrastructure constraints than by conscious decisions by unaccountable or unresponsive regimes. Such deliberate inaction has occurred not only in the world's weakest states but also in stronger developing countries, even in promising democracies. The list is long. It includes Nigeria's feckless response to a 2003-05 polio epidemic, China's lack of candor about the 2003 SARS outbreak, Indonesia's obstructionist attitude to addressing bird flu in 2008 and South Africa's denial for many years about the causes of HIV/AIDS. Unfortunately, misperceptions about the dangers of failed states have transformed budgets and bureaucracies. U.S. intelligence agencies are mapping the world's “ungoverned spaces.” The Pentagon has turned its regional Combatant Commands into platforms to head off state failure and address its spillover effects. The new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review completed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development depicts fragile and conflict-riddled states as epicenters of terrorism, proliferation, crime and disease. Yet such **preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis.** U.S. national security officials would be better served — and would serve all of us better — if they turned their strategic lens toward stronger developing countries, from which transnational threats

**No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant**

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that **none exist**. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

**No risk of bioterror**

**Mueller 99**, John Mueller, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State and Karl Mueller, June, ’99 (Foreign Affairs, l/n)

Biological weapons seem a promising candidate to join nuclear ones in the WMD club because, properly developed and deployed, they might indeed kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical, however, because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used, even though knowledge of their destructive potential goes back centuries. (The English, for example, made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians during the French and Indian War.) Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason, because biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and control. Although terrorist groups or rogue states may overcome such problems in the future through advances in knowledge and technology, the record thus far is not likely to encourage them. Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures may have killed thousands of Chinese but apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and had little military impact. In the 1990s the large and extremely well funded Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo apparently tried at least nine times to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops. these efforts failed to cause a single fatality -- in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place. For best results biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds, which is very difficult to do. Explosive methods of dispersion, moreover, may destroy the organisms. And except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult; even if refrigerated, most have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons are gradual, very hard to predict, and could spread back onto the attacker, and they can be countered with civil defense measures.

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# CIR

#### Immigration reform is key to Mexican stability and border cooperation

Castaneda ‘3

(Castañeda, Jorge G. Source: Foreign Affairs; May/Jun2003, Vol. 82 Issue 3, p67-81, 15p, 4 Black and White Photographs)

Dealing with Mexico is in many ways the most important regional task facing the Bush administration. The matter can be summed up simply: President Vicente Fox's consolidation of Mexico's first democratic transfer of power must be-and be seen to be-a success. There is nothing more important to the United States than a stable Mexico, and today a stable Mexico means a democratic one. And the United States has a huge role in making Mexico's transition to democracy a success, or in contributing to its failure. The success or failure of this experiment will be judged in Mexico ultimately in the light of the country's economic performance-which has not been impressive these past two years. But Mexicans will also judge the state of their country's relations with the United States. They will look to see whether Presidents Fox and Bush deliver on the ambitious bilateral agenda they sketched out at their historic February 2001 meeting at Fox's ranch in Guanajuato, Mexico. On issues of trade, drug enforcement, the border, building a North American Economic Community, energy, and, most significant, immigration, the two countries set out a bold series of goals to meet by the end of Bush's first term, if not sooner. Indeed, in the first eight months of their respective presidencies, Bush and Fox achieved a fundamental breakthrough on immigration. By the time of the Guanajuato meeting, both sides had identified the core policies needed to tackle undocumented migration flows from Mexico to the United States: an expanded temporary-worker program; increased transition of undocumented Mexicans already in the United States to legal status; a higher U.S. visa quota for Mexicans; enhanced border security and stronger action against migrant traffickers; and more investment in those regions of Mexico that supplied the most migrants. The speed with which both governments carried out these negotiations certainly captured the political imagination of both societies. Fox's resounding state visit to Washington on the eve of the September 11 terrorist attacks further lifted the new initiatives and underscored both leaders' commitment to them. But the symmetry ends there: Fox staked much more on this partnership than Bush did. And since the Mexican president has little to show for his gamble, he has paid a high domestic political price for his willingness to bring about a sea change in Mexico's relations with the United States and the rest of the world. Indeed, this change has been on the order of what President Carlos Salinas did with Mexico's economy or what President Ernesto Zedillo did with the nation's political system. Hence the centrality of immigration in the bilateral relationship today: both Bush and Fox stated dramatic goals and raised expectations enormously. The United States understandably was forced to put the issue on hold for a time. But what was initially portrayed as a brief interlude will now probably stretch through Bush's entire first term. It will be almost impossible to point to success in the bilateral relationship without a deal on immigration. And unless there is such a breakthrough, Fox's six-year term in office, nearly half over, may well be seen in Mexico as an exercise in high expectations but disappointing results. To avoid a breakdown in relations, Bush must make a state visit to Mexico City this year. He should take with him sufficient progress on key issues-immigration; trade concerns relating to sugar, tuna, trucking, and the North American Free Trade Agreement's agricultural chapter; and funding for heightened security and the expedited passage of people and cargo at the border-to show that Mexico remains a top priority for his administration. Bush must also show that he is willing to spend political capital to ensure the success of Fox's push for true Mexican democracy. Washington may have so far missed an opportunity to present its relationship with Mexico City as a model for the rest of the hemisphere and, indeed, for the rest of the developing world-an example of how a rich and powerful neighbor and a still relatively poor and weak one can get along and contribute to each other's success. But the window of opportunity has not been shut. In the aftermath of the current conflict with Iraq, the United States would benefit hugely by demonstrating that it can construct alliances beyond its traditional circle of friends.

#### Obama’s pushing CIR now --- makes passage likely

Stokols, 10/17

Eli Stokols, political reporter for Fox News – "the face of political journalism on local TV news" in Denver; “ANALYSIS: Obama’s quick pivot to immigration reform,” 10/17/2013, http://kdvr.com/2013/10/17/analysis-obamas-quick-pivot-to-immigration-reform //bghs-ms

On Thursday morning, Obama looked to press his advantage by urging Republicans in Congress to end the political brinksmanship and to start working together with Democrats on budget negotiations, immigration reform and the farm bill that has stalled in the House.¶ “To all my friends in Congress, understand that how business is done in this town has to change,” Obama said, implicitly chiding the Republicans who seemingly oppose his administration at every turn.¶ “You don’t like a particular policy, or a particular president, then argue for your position,” Mr. Obama said in the 15-minute statement. “Go out there and win an election. Push to change it. But don’t break it.”¶ While another stern lecture from the president isn’t likely to improve relations between the White House and Capitol Hill, Obama does have a stronger hand in the upcoming political fights; and by pivoting quickly to immigration reform, **he’s taking advantage of a sudden window of opportunity.**¶During his remarks Thursday, Obama re-framed the debate over comprehensive immigration reform, reminding the country of the Senate proposal, passed with broad bipartisan support earlier this year, that’s lingering in the House.¶ “There’s already a broad coalition across America that’s behind this effort of comprehensive immigration reform — from business leaders to faith leaders to law enforcement,” the president said.¶ “In fact, the Senate has already passed a bill with strong bipartisan support that would make the biggest commitment to border security in our history; would modernize our legal immigration system; make sure everyone plays by the same rules, makes sure that folks who came here illegally have to pay a fine, pay back taxes, meet their responsibilities.”¶ The legislation, crafted by a bipartisan group of eight senators including Colorado Sen. Michael Bennet, a Democrat, would spend $46 billion to enhance security on the U.S. Mexico border and create a 13-year path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.¶ “It will establish a sensible and rational system for the future flow of immigrants to this country, put in place a process to reunite families and provide a path to citizenship for millions of people who came to this country for a better but are living in the shadows of our society,” Bennet said. “I suggest the House take a hard look at the Senate bill. There is no reason we can’t work out a final bill to pass into law in the coming months.”¶ Obama noted that the legislation is likely to grow the nation’s economy over the next several decades.¶ “Our economy would be 5 percent larger two decades from now,” the president said. “That’s $1.4 trillion in new economic growth.¶ “The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do. And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. **This can and should get done by the end of this year**.”¶ The president is speaking to a House GOP caucus that is fractured into factions, the body’s growing dysfunction writ large by the debacle of the last two weeks.¶ While many of the conservative hard-liners who aimed to dismantle Obamacare by shutting down the government will never support comprehensive immigration reform, more moderate Republicans — those concerned with the GOP’s ability to win national elections, not just their own grip on their safe, gerrymandered, primary-ripe seats — have likely been chastened by recent polls showing their approval ratings in the 20s.¶ On immigration reform, Republican leaders have another impossible choice**.**¶Speaker John Boehner can again listen to the rank and file members and refuse to take up the Senate bill or he can listen to business groups interested in growing the country’s educated workforce — and risk revolt from within his caucus — by moving ahead on a policy issue that could **help the party repair its image** with the public and broaden its appeal to Hispanics, the country’s fastest growing demographic group.¶ **The White House knows this.**¶ **Pressing for** comprehensive immigration reform is a win-win: either win passage of another landmark law that will add to Obama’s legacy, or solidify the public’s current perception of the GOP as a party that’s controlled by it’s far-right flank and appears closed to Hispanics and other minorities heading into next year’s midterms.¶ Of those two scenarios, most Washington observers are betting on the latter.¶ Congressman Cory Gardner, R-Yuma, told FOX31 Denver the day after last November’s election that saw President Obama reelected in large part due to overwhelming support from Hispanic voters, that his party understood the political imperative of working with Democrats on comprehensive immigration reform.

#### Top conservatives agree it’ll pass

Silva, 10/17

Mark Silva, deputy managing editor for government news in Washington and editor of Political Capital; “Immigration Next: Old-Fashioned Way, Jeb Bush Recommends,” 10/17/2013, http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2013-10-17/immigration-next-old-fashioned-way-jeb-bush-recommends //bghs-ms

Next up: Immigration.¶ Jeb Bush, former Florida governor, brother of one president, son of another and the one serious-minded Republican who probably won’t run for the White House in 2016, says it’s time for Congress to get serious about immigration.¶ Bush is framing the urgency of the debate in economic terms.¶ “An economically driven immigration system –I think that’s a conservative idea,” Bush said this morning on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe.” It oughta be passed.”¶ His argument is that immigration has always been an economic engine, a source of entrepreneurial power that has fueled the nation’s growth — and that, as the “broken immigration system” stands, it is thwarting potential growth by keeping millions of undocumented immigrants in the dark and preventing professional talent educated either in the U.S. or abroad from putting their skills to work here.¶ President Barack Obama, who endorses the “comprehensive” approach that the Senate approved this year — offering g a path to citizenship for the undocumented while cracking down on illegal immigration and expanding visas — has signaled that he will press the Republican-run House to start moving on its own measures now that the budget debacle has ended — or at least been pushed back to January and February. A bipartisan group of lawmakers in the House is working on their own comprehensive plan, while leaders take a piece by piece approach to bills.¶ They ought to get it done the old-fashioned way, Bush, co-author of the book, “Immigration Wars,” suggested today: Get a bill out of the House and take it to conference with the Senate, negotiate a solution in traditional legislative form rather than the crisis-oriented standoffs that have marked so much of the budgetary debate in recent years, and this week.¶ Sen. Chuck Schumer, a New York Democrat and one of the senators who crafted the bipartisan agreement on that side, said on the same show today that he holds hope of getting something through the House. Leaders **such as House Budget Chairman Paul Ryan and Majority Leader Eric Cantor understand the need**.¶ “I hope the leadership in the House brings it back and creates a conservative alternative that a majority of House members could support,” Bush said today. “Look our immigration system is broken, it doesn’t work, and we have a chance to fix it.”

#### Obama’s focusing his capital on CIR now --- that’s key to passing the bill

The Hindu, 10/17

“Obama administration urges House to pass immigration reform bill,” 10/17/2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/obama-administration-urges-house-to-pass-immigration-reform-bill/article5243051.ece?homepage=true //bghs-ms

The Obama Administration has urged the House of Representatives to pass the immigration reform bill that would provide a pathway to citizenship to millions of undocumented people and accelerate the immigration of professionals from countries like India and China.¶ “Now, that legislation passed the Senate with a significant bipartisan majority, and he (Mr. Obama) absolutely believes that the House ought to take up that legislation and pass it. And as we’ve discussed in recent days, **that’s not a partisan pursuit; it’s the opposite of a partisan pursuit, one, because it requires votes from both parties, and it also would benefit both parties**,” the White House Press Secretary, Jay Carney, said.¶ “There is no question that the decision by the House to shut the government down and to flirt with default has forced him and everyone in Congress to pay attention to those problems and to those crises rather than the many other things that we could and should be working on, and immigration reform is one of them,” he said.¶ Mr. Carney said there are many proponents of comprehensive immigration reform in the Republican Party and within the broader Republican universe.¶ “He wants to continue the effort that has been underway all year to try to pass a bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform legislation that would strengthen the economy, help our middle class, reduce the deficit and make us more competitive in the future,” he said.

#### Plan is unpopular – bureaucracy causes backlash

**Dallas Morning News** July **2008** “EDITORIAL: NADBank deserves U.S. funding” ProQuest

Not everyone agrees about the merits of the North American Free Trade Agreement, but it's hard to argue that the North American Development Bank, created under NAFTA, hasn't brought overwhelmingly positive changes to the border region. NADBank's good work needs to continue, and that won't happen if Congress continues to whittle down its funding.¶ Before NAFTA, the border region was an environmental disaster zone. Mexican border towns dumped millions of gallons of raw sewage into area rivers. Tap water was undrinkable. Pollution and industrial waste abounded. It's better now, but much cleanup work remains to be done.¶ Through grants and low-interest loans, NADBank has sparked more than $1.4 billion in public infrastructure projects on both sides of the border. This is not sexy stuff. Much of it involves sewage-treatment plants, landfill sites, water projects and road work. NADBank officials estimate that such projects have halted the dumping of about 300 million gallons per day of sewage into the Rio Grande and other waterways.¶ Washington's skepticism about NADBank has grown in recent years, partly because the bank has been slow to disburse its funds. Bank officials say the backlog was caused by the two-year average lead time needed to study, plan and approve each project before it could be funded. Steps are under way to streamline its processes, bolster accountability and reduce backlogs.¶ As the fervor over NAFTA has died down, so has Capitol Hill's enthusiasm for funding NADBank. Initial U.S. appropriations of nearly $100 million a year have steadily been slashed since NAFTA took effect 14 years ago. The requested 2009 appropriation is only $10 million.¶ Texas Sens. Kay Bailey Hutchison and John Cornyn have been enthusiastic supporters of NADBank in the past. A renewed funding push by them and other border-state legislators would help ensure that the bank's important work stays on track in the future.

#### The plan puts border security before the rest of immigration reform – kills the deal

**Grant, 13** (4-27, David, Politics for the Christian Science Monitor, “How border security 'trigger' could stop immigration reform.” The CSM, 4/27/13 ln//GBS-JV)

Congressional negotiators say immigration reform will need a border security 'trigger' to pass. But agreeing on what counts as 'border security' won't be easy, and could determine whether reform happens. Immigration reformers want to bring the more than 10 million undocumented immigrants out of the shadows. Border security hawks want assurances that if they go along with that plan, they won’t be back in 10 years deciding whether or not to legalize 10 million more. What’s Congress to do?¶ Figure out a “trigger,” where advances in border security are deemed sufficient to trigger the beginning of the journey to citizenship for the undocumented already in the country.¶ As immigration reform negotiations continue, determining just what counts as a “secure border” and how to link that to plans for the undocumented will be crucial. Indeed, finding an answer could determine whether a bipartisan immigration reform measure reaches President Obama’s desk or if 2013 is yet another disappointment for reformers. Historically, those on Capitol Hill have tried to craft a delicate balance between border security and a path to legal status for the undocumented. For example, the comprehensive immigration reform legislation of the George W. Bush years, which ultimately failed, had a series of triggers. In 2009, Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York proposed more broadly that “operational control” of the border “must be achieved within a year of enactment of legislation.”¶ But those triggers aren't helpful anymore. Most of the benchmarks for border security established in 2007, for example, have been met today, according to an analysis by the pro-reform advocacy group America’s Voice.¶ Border patrol staffing north of 20,000? Check: there are more than 21,000 agents on the border at present. Requirements for unmanned drones and a variety of other observation methods? All are at or above the 2007 requirements today. Fencing? Within eight miles of the 2007 target. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said on Tuesday that while the department lacks a single measure on which to base a trigger – and that a trigger based on any single measure would be a bad idea – all the data DHS collects point to a border safer than ever before.¶ Some Democrats and immigration reform advocates take this to say that the border is secure already and should not stand in the way of the undocumented becoming US citizens even if further border security measures are needed.¶ Republican reformers like Sen. John McCain of Arizona have a slightly different view, holding that while the southern border certainly is far improved from nearly a decade ago there’s still plenty of room for improvement.¶ “There's no question there's been a significant reduction in illegal crossings over the past five years…. But that work is not yet complete,” Senator McCain said in January at the press conference announcing a bipartisan Gang of Eight’s principles.¶ Other Republicans, like Sen. Jeff Sessions (R) of Alabama, are skeptical of such claims and believe figuring out just what constitutes a secure border should be among the goals of a lengthy series of hearings around immigration reform.¶ So what do lawmakers propose to do this time around? Mr. Obama’s answer appears to be scrap the trigger altogether.¶ His immigration statements have notably left out any linkage between border security and permanent legal status for the undocumented, noting in his immigration reform plan that if an undocumented person meets certain criteria including paying fines, learning English, and waiting until all other current prospective immigrants have passed through the immigration system, “there will be no uncertainty about their ability to become US citizens.”

#### Congress is key

**Mooney ’13** (Alex Mooney, CNN White House Producer, 2/6/13, Unions could again be key to immigration reform, www.cnn.com/2013/02/05/politics/immigration-reform-unions)

It should come as no surprise that prominent union leaders are among the first group President Barack Obama courts as he seeks support for overhauling immigration policy. It was organized labor that helped ensure defeat of a bipartisan effort to reform the nation's immigration laws five years ago. At that time, the AFL-CIO and other prominent union groups came out against the initiative, fearing a proposal for a temporary guest worker program for seasonal workers would weaken union membership and bargaining clout. That led to a handful of liberal-leaning Democrats to vote against the bill, including Sens. Sherrod Brown, Tom Harkin and Debbie Stabenow. Mindful that a potential split in the Democratic coalition this time around could again prove fatal to the passage of an immigration bill, Obama met on Tuesday with more than a dozen labor.

#### More evidence – it’s a sequencing thing – border security before the rest of immigration reform shuts down the compromise

**DC ’13** [The Daily Caller, “Schumer: Legalizing Illegal immigrants won’t be stopped by border security needs” 1/31/13 http://dailycaller.com/2013/01/31/schumer-legalizing-illegal-immigrants-wont-be-stopped-by-border-security-needs/#ixzz2aSi9ejNQ//GBS-JV]

New York Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer said securing the nation’s borders should not be used as “a barrier” to giving illegal immigrants living in the U.S. a pathway to citizenship.¶ ¶ “We want the border to be secure. It’s more secure than it was several years ago, but it has a ways to go. And different sectors need different types of security. It’s a lot different having security in the Tucson sector than off the stretch in Texas, which is bounded by the Rio Grande,” Schumer said on Thursday.¶ ¶ “But we’re not using border security as an excuse or block to the path of citizenship. We just want to make sure — and this is very important both substantively and politically — that there is a secure border, and we’re going to work for that. But it’s not — and Dick [Durbin] and I and Bob [Menendez], as well as our three Republican friends, want to make sure the border’s secure but not to use it as a barrier to prevent the 11 million from eventually gaining a path to citizenship.” Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio, who joined a bipartisan group to announce an immigration reform blueprint earlier this week, argues that increased border security should come before a pathway to citizenship.

#### Even if winners win is true, presidents consider PC to be real and finite –the plan causes him to back off other controversial issues

Marshall et al 11

[Bryan W, Miami University BRANDON C. PRINS University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September)

We argue that the more important effect of Congress occurs because presidents anticipate how the use of force may affect the larger congressional environment in which they inevitably have to operate (Brulé, Marshall, and Prins 2010). It may be true that presidents consider the chances that Congress will react to a specific use of force with countervailing tools, but even more importantly they anticipate the likelihood that a foreign conflict may damage (or advantage) their political fortunes elsewhere—in essence, the presidential calculus to use force factors in how such actions might shape their ability to achieve legislative priorities. To be clear, presidents can and do choose to use force and press for legislative initiatives in Congress. Taking unilateral actions in foreign policy does not preclude the president from working the legislative process on Capitol Hill. However, **political capital is finite so spending resources in one area lessens what the president can bring to bear in other areas.** That is, presidents consider the congressional environment in their decision to use force because their success at promoting policy change in either foreign or domestic affairs is largely determined by their relationship with Congress. Presidents do not make such decisions devoid of calculations regarding congressional preferences and behavior or how such decisions may influence their ability to achieve legislative objectives. This is true in large part because presidential behavior is motivated by multiple goals that are intimately tied to Congress. Presidents place a premium on passing legislative initiatives. The passage of policy is integral to their goals of reelection and enhancing their place in history (Canes-Wrone 2001; Moe 1985). Therefore, presidents seek to build and protect their relationship with Congress.

#### Even if winners win is true, he concedes an independent agenda crowd-out link

Michael Hirsh, National Journal, 2/7/13, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.

# Case – Coop

#### Bioweapons fail

**Smithson 5** (Amy E., PhD, project director for biological weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center. “Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons,” http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259]

Terrorists cannot count on just filling the delivery system with agent, pointing the device, and flipping the switch to activate it. Facets that must be deciphered include the concentration of agent in the delivery system, the ways in which **the delivery system degrades the potency of the agent**, and the right dosage to incapacitate or kill human or animal targets. For open-air delivery, the meteorological conditions must be taken into account. Biological agents **have extreme sensitivity to sunlight, humidity, pollutants in the atmosphere, temperature,** **and even exposure to oxygen**, **all of which can kill the microbes**. Biological agents can be dispersed in either dry or wet forms. Using a dry agent can boost effectiveness because drying and milling the agent can make the particles very fine, a key factor since particles must range between 1 to 10 ten microns, ideally to 1 to 5, to be breathed into the lungs. Drying an agent, however, is done through a complex and challenging process that requires a sophistication of equipment and know-how that terrorist organizations are unlikely to possess. The alternative is to develop a wet slurry, which is much easier to produce but a great deal harder to disperse effectively. Wet slurries can clog sprayers and undergo mechanical stresses that can kill 95 percent or more of the microorganisms.

#### Border breaches are inevitable – even the most fortified borders leak

**Allen, 12** Senior Fellow at CFR (Edward, CATO Journal, “Immigration and Border Control”, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj32n1/cj32n1-8.pdf> )

But border security for the purpose of dissuading illegal migration is an entirely different matter. Here, **perfect security cannot be the goal**. **Even the Cold War border between the two Germanies—the most heavily fortified in modern history—was successfully breached a thousand or so times each year.** There is simply no way for a large, open, and democratic country like the United States to construct and maintain perfect border defenses. It is hard to think of another issue where the public debate is so utterly at odds with what the government can realistically achieve (Ziglar and Alden 2011).

#### Terrorists do not enter the US from the Mexican border

**Ball, 13** (Molly Ball, journalist for The Atlantic and The Next America National Journal, “Will Immigration hawks ever think the border is secure enough?,” 2/22/13, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/immigration/will-immigration-hawks-ever-think-the-border-is-secure-enough-20130222>, 7/2/13)

Terrorists are not coming over the border. There's never been a reported case of a terrorist attack in the U.S. that involved someone coming across the Mexican border. A congressional subcommittee report on the threat of cross-border terrorism [cited unsubstantiated claims and three specific cases](http://borderfactcheck.tumblr.com/post/40769077146/cross-border-terrorism-does-evidence-to-compel), including a Tunisian cleric caught hiding in the trunk of a car in San Diego who was not accused of involvement in any terrorist activity. The other two also were not linked to specific terrorist plots.

#### Can’t solve border terrorism – they’ll use other means or adapt

**Allen, 12** Senior Fellow at CFR (Edward, CATO Journal, “Immigration and Border Control”, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj32n1/cj32n1-8.pdf> SW)

The third need is to reconsider our understanding of national security and border control. The close link in the public mind is largely a result of the specific circumstances of the 9/11 attacks, in which all the attackers entered the United States from overseas. The result has been an intense focus on policies designed to prevent similar future attacks, and border control has figured prominently. But if the attacks had been carried out by individuals who had lived many years in the United States—such as the perpetrators of the 2005 London subway bombing, who were all born or raised in the United Kingdon—the response would have been quite different. Immigration policy might still have figured prominently in the reaction, but the issue would have been—as it has largely been in Europe—the failure of integration rather than the failure of border control. Border control is a very limited counterterrorism tool. While it can raise the hurdles for entry, there are many other ways to carry out terrorist attacks successfully. It is not coincidental that since 9/11 the majority of the terrorist conspiracies in the United States have involved U.S. citizens or permanent immigrants rather than recent arrivals. Terrorist groups have simply adapted to tougher border controls and recruited accordingly (Alden 2010c).

#### U.S. – Mexico border has never been safer – any threats are exaggerated

**Ball, 13** (Molly Ball, journalist for The Atlantic and The Next America National Journal, “Will Immigration hawks ever think the border is secure enough?,” 2/22/13, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/immigration/will-immigration-hawks-ever-think-the-border-is-secure-enough-20130222>, 7/2/13)

Border security could be the issue that kills immigration reform. And yet, by most measures, the U.S.-Mexico border has never been safer.¶ The bipartisan group of U.S. senators seeking comprehensive immigration reform have proposed [a "trigger" mechanism](http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/06/16869322-progressives-pressure-obama-on-immigration-reform-triggers?lite), whereby a path to citizenship would be contingent on increased border security. President Obama and liberals have not endorsed the idea, although the president is "committed to increasing our border security further," according to White House Press Secretary Jay Carney.¶ Disagreement over the trigger is the largest current discrepancy between the Senate and White House versions of immigration reform. It could cause the whole thing to fall apart. Yet the idea -- expressed by both sides -- that the border needs more security may be the biggest myth of the immigration debate, according to Rep. Beto O'Rourke.¶ A newly elected Democrat, O'Rourke represents El Paso, Texas, the border city that shares a street grid -- and 11 border inspection stations -- with the Mexican city of Juarez. El Paso also has the lowest crime rate of any large U.S. city. (The second-safest large city? It's on the border, too: San Diego.)¶ The common assumption, O'Rourke told me recently, "is that the border is not secure." In fact, by almost any measure -- crime, unauthorized border crossings, resources devoted to border patrol -- the U.S.-Mexico border has never been more secure than it is now.¶ The problem for the immigration debate is that those who claim we need more border security are rarely called upon to prove it. No one has proposed a set of concrete standards; rather, some are calling for a subjective evaluation to be made by border-state governors, some of whom have political incentives to exaggerate the threat -- and track records of doing so.

### 1nc – terror

**No risk of border terrorism --- it’s hype and status quo relations solve --- plus they’d come through Canada**

**McCombs 11** (Brady, Correspondent – Arizona Daily Star, Citing Edward Alden, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, Arizona Daily Star, 6-7, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article\_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html, Deech)

A turning political tide has renewed fears that raged after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks - that terrorists will sneak into the country across the U.S.-Mexico border. Nobody disputes that's possible, but analysts and government officials say terrorists plotting to kill Americans are more likely to use **other routes** into the country, if they're not **here already**. It's much more common for people convicted in the U.S. of crimes connected to international terrorism to have been **U.S. citizens** or legal residents, or come into the country on visas. "There is **no** serious **evidence** that the U.S.-Mexico border is a significant threat from terrorism," said Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank based in New York. Claims of terrorist threats on the Southwest border distract legislators and policymakers from addressing long-term solutions to drug smuggling and illegal immigration, said Tom Barry, senior analyst at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "It's **politically motivated**," Barry said, "playing on that sense of **fear** that certain people are susceptible to." But proponents of tougher border enforcement say protecting Americans against terrorism motivates them, not politics. "There's an enormous risk," said Michael Braun, who retired as chief of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008. Members of Hezbollah, for example, "are absolute masters at identifying existing smuggling infrastructures on many borders around the world where they operate." The State Department's 2009 "Country Reports on Terrorism" found that "**no** known international terrorist organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and **no terrorist incidents** targeting U.S. interests and personnel occurred on or originated from Mexican territory." The State Department said that there was **no evidence** of ties between Mexican organized crime and international terrorist groups. But it warns: "The violence attributed to organized-crime groups on the border, however, continued to strain Mexico's law-enforcement capacities, creating potential vulnerabilities that terrorists seeking access to the United States could exploit." Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu emphasized the risk of terrorists crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. in a May 26 open letter to President Obama. "If the majority of regular illegal immigrants can sneak into America, what does this say about the ability of terrorist sleeper cells?" Babeu wrote. "The porous U.S.-Mexican border is the gravest national-security threat facing America." Hiding in a car trunk In his letter to the president, Babeu said thousands of illegal immigrants hailing from "special-interest countries" make the U.S.-Mexico border a national-security threat. "In some cases, we have confirmed their troubling ties to terrorism," Babeu wrote. "Yet for those we apprehend, how many today live amongst us?" The Border Patrol apprehended an average of 339 people from "special-interest countries" - those that warrant special handling based on terrorism risk factors - at the U.S.-Mexico border each year over the past six years, Homeland Security data show. That's less than 1 percent each year of the total apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border, Homeland Security figures show. **None** of the 2,039 people arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border in that span presented a credible terrorist threat, Homeland Security officials say. Homeland Security monitors, analyzes and **gathers intelligence** about potential threats but at this time "does not have **any credible information** on terrorist groups operating along the Southwest border," said department spokesman Matt Chandler. Among the 36 people convicted by the U.S. Justice Department of charges relating to international terrorism last year, none came into the United States from Mexico. Half were U.S. citizens, most of them naturalized from countries such as Sudan or Somalia. Seven were extradited from other countries, while three were captured abroad by American forces. The others came to the United States on visas, or, in one case, were arrested while trying to come into the United States legally at a port of entry on the Canadian border. However, over the last decade there have been a handful of cases in which suspected terrorists or Muslim extremists crossed the Mexican border illegally. None led to attempted terrorist attacks in the United States. In 2001, for example, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani rode into the United States in the trunk of a car coming from Tijuana. He went on to live in Dearborn, Mich., but was arrested in 2003, and in 2005 was convicted of conspiring to send money to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In January of this year, an extremist imam from Tunisia, Said Jaziri, was arrested while riding in the trunk of a car on a highway east of San Diego. Jaziri, who was expelled from Canada in 2007, hiked across the Mexican border with another illegal immigrant, and both were picked up by an American driver. But a firefighter saw them pile into the trunk and reported them to Border Patrol agents, who pulled the car over and found the men. Jaziri was charged with a misdemeanor immigration violation. not A traditional route Over the last two decades, almost **all** of the known international terrorists arrested in the United States have come on **legal visas** or were allowed to come in without a visa, said Alden, of the Council on Foreign Relations. "These are people that come on airplanes," said Alden, author of "The Closing of the American Border," which explains how the U.S. revised visa and border policies in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The 19 people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks entered the country on legal visas. And over the last four to five years, the terrorist plots have increasingly involved people already in the United States - citizens and legal residents, he said. "The notion of the (Southwest) border as the line that protects us from terrorism has really gone out of the window in the last several years," Alden said. Not only is the U.S. side of the border **heavily guarded**, but the Mexican government makes an **extraordinary effort** to prevent terrorists from coming through its country. For instance, Mexico **shares** real-time **information** with the U.S. about airline passengers arriving in Mexico to make sure they don't include potential terrorists, Alden said. The Mexican drug-smuggling organizations have **no interest** in allowing smuggling routes to be used by terrorist organizations either, he said. "If it is discovered that a terrorist that carried out an attack in the United States came across the Mexican border, then the response would be further fortification of that border that shuts down smuggling routes and cuts into the profits," he said. Being associated with terrorist groups would be **very bad** for business for drug-smuggling organizations, said Sylvia Longmire, a drug-war analyst and author. Proof of a terrorist coming through Mexico would have dire consequences for the Mexican government, too, she said. But that point of view ignores the fact that terrorist groups and Latin American drug smugglers sometimes do business with each other and therefore have connections, said Braun, the former DEA operations chief, who now runs a security-consulting firm, Spectre Group International. "Hezbollah is now heavily involved in the global cocaine trade," Braun said. "Most of the cocaine they're involved in distributing is heading toward Europe, but they're affiliating with the same cartels sending drugs to the United States." That isn't to say the groups share an ideology, but simply that they have the connections needed to exploit smuggling routes into the United States. Also, people from the Middle East tend to have dark hair, dark eyes and olive skin, like most Latin Americans, so they can easily blend in, he said. "On a moonless night at two in the morning, there's not a lot of due diligence going on when the coyotes and gatekeepers are moving human traffic across that border," Braun said. Canada is a **more likely** crossing point because that country allows in more people as refugees and asylum seekers, said Henry Willis, a senior policy researcher on homeland security at the Rand Corp. "To regard the Southwestern border as the 'frontline against terrorism,' as the Border Patrol does, is folly," wrote Barry, of the Center for International Policy, in a recent report.

**Status quo solves border terrorism --- US law enforcement is sufficient**

**Isacson 13** (Adam, Regional Security Policy Expert – Washington Office on Latin America, “Cross-border terrorism: does “evidence to compel" further action exist?”, Washington Office on Latin America, 1-17, http://borderfactcheck.tumblr.com/post/40769077146/cross-border-terrorism-does-evidence-to-compel, Deech)

The authors of the Subcommittee report are right that the hypothetical scenario of terrorists crossing the border from Mexico demands constant vigilance. It would be irresponsible to dismiss it. But with the evidence they present — **vague** official statements, three cases with no mention of any intent to engage in terrorist activity — the authors of the report do not make the case that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies need to be **more vigilant** than they already are. The amount of intelligence, military and law enforcement resources available to monitor potential threats is finite. With more immediate concerns in North Africa, Syria, Afghanistan-Pakistan and elsewhere, the resources available to monitor Latin America and the Caribbean are even more limited. U.S. authorities must choose wisely how these resources get used. Organized crime, money laundering, arms, drug and human trafficking, corruption, and migrant deaths already pose daily challenges in the U.S.-Mexico border area. Preparing for possible cross-border Islamic terrorism is a significant additional challenge, but the Subcommittee report acknowledges that it requires **“imagination”** at this point. The State Department, meanwhile, reported last July that **“no known** international terrorist organization had an operational presence in Mexico and **no terrorist group** targeted U.S. citizens in or from Mexican territory.” In our view, the evidence presented in the Line in the Sand report is not compelling enough to justify diverting resources — whether existing or additional — away from challenges that U.S. personnel already face every day in the U.S.-Mexico border zone.

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# Case – Manu

**Deterrence failure is very unlikely. Proliferation saves far more lives than it costs.**

**Preston 7** (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR—Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate—Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 31-32)

1.) The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, **it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur** (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters — whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions —none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that **these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars**. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through nonnuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in **favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars**, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3 Further, as Gray (1999, 158-59) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that **have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior** (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

**Conventional war is really deadly**

**Arbatov et al 89** (Alexei, Head, Nikolae Kishilov, Head of Section, and Oleg Amirov, Senior Researcher, Department on Problems of Disarmament—Institute of world Economic and International Relations, in “Conventional arms Control and East-West Security”, Ed. Robert Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, p. 76-78)

A large-scale conventional war, even if it would not quickly boil over into a nuclear war, would have numerous unpredictable features that would make it quite dissimilar to World War II, the experience of which continues to be used even now as the point of departure for the strategic and operational planning of combat operations for NATO and WTO ground forces, air forces and naval forces. The fact that during the past 40 years incomparably greater changes have taken place in technology than those that took place in the earlier interwar periods of 1870-1914 and 1918-1939 supports such a conclusion. Therefore, war in the modern era is even less similar to World War II than that war was to War World I, and the latter in turn to the Franco-Prussian war. It is exceptionally difficult, if it is possible at all, to predict its course. But there is every justification to say that the numerous contradictions and paradoxes of a hypothetical new war would in practice have the most unexpected consequences, consequences most likely incompatible with the concept of "protracted" conventional combat on the European continent or on a global scale. This concerns, for example, the fact that the sharply increased interdependence of different types of armed forces and troops, individual formations and units and various weapons systems is a distinguishing feature of the functioning of enormous and highly complex organizations, which is what modern armed forces are. A great spacial scope of operations (on the scale of entire TVDs), the rapidity and intensity of combat actions, and the multinational structure of opposing coalitions of states will characterize their actions. All of this poses unprecedently high demands for coordinating the actions of all elements of military potentials and for carefully planning operations, their priority, sequence of interaction and so on. At the same time, the character of modern warfare makes inevitable the constant and rapid change of the combat situation on the fronts, deep breakthroughs and envelopments, and the intermixing of one's own and others' formations, units and subunits. In view of the high maneuverability of troops even the traditional FEBA may no longer exist. In place of it zones of combat contact of a depth of dozens of kilometers will arise and rapidly change and shift. The unpredictability, mutability and intensity of probable combat actions would so overload the capabilities of a centralized command and control in the theater of war and the separate TVDs that they would most likely rapidly lead to total chaos. The intensity of the anticipated combat also renders inevitable exceptionally great losses in arms and equipment. At the same time, because of the rapid increase in the cost of weapons systems, the quantitative levels of armed forces and arms on the whole have a tendency to decrease. Fewer but much improved and more powerful arms have a much lesser chance than in World War II of being used repeatedly in several battles. Their longevity will entirely depend on how successfully they may outstrip the opponent and destroy his forces and capabilities earlier than they will be destroyed by him. Therefore, combat actions will in any event most likely have a short-term character, if not for both, then at least for one of the sides. And this is not to mention the enormous losses among the civilian population and the damage to the economic infrastructure in the region of combat, which may now envelop the greatest and most densely populated portion of the European continent. Neither the population, economy nor ecology of Europe can withstand a large-scale conventional war for any amount of time—even in the improbable event that nuclear power stations, chemical enterprises and nuclear and chemical weapons depots are not destroyed. The limited capabilities of the "human factor" in conditions of modern battle are clearly demonstrated by the experience of the local wars of the 197os and the 198os. Thus, for maintaining the combat capability of troops at a "sufficiently high level" during the Falklands conflict (1982), the British command was forced to replace forward units every two days. Furthermore, the high sortie rate of Great Britain's air force and naval aviation in this period was guaranteed largely thanks to the use of special medicinal preparations. Naturally, it is impossible to compare and carry over the experience of individual local conflicts to potential large-scale combat operations on the European continent, where their character would be quite different both in terms of intensity and scope. This concerns the anticipated transient "fire contacts" with the rapid change of the tactical and operational situation, the threat of using nuclear weapons at any moment, the swift advance of enemy troops, the simultaneous envelopment of large territories with combat actions, the premeditated violation of lines of communication and C3I, and the conduct of combat operations at any time of the day (including at night) and under any weather conditions—all of which maximally increase the physical and psychological stress on a person, and cannot be compared with what took place in the years of World War II, in the Middle East in 1973 or in the Falkland Islands in 1982. It is also necessary to observe that the replacement of the leading units by their withdrawal to the rear for rest and replenishment, as was done in the past, becomes practically impossible in the conditions of large-scale combat operations. Where to withdraw the units for rest, and at what time, if just 3o-5o kilometers from the front there would be a zone of combat operations just as intense as at the forward line? Any assessments of the losses of the sides participating in the conflict can only be highly abstract. Only one thing is clear—the human and material losses in the event of a "general conventional war" will be characterized, undoubtedly, by a scale many hundreds of times greater than that in analogous conflicts of the past, and, what is especially important, by a significantly higher "attrition rate" of people and equipment, of the share of irreplaceable losses.

**Benefits outweigh the costs 40 to 1**

**de Mesquita and Riker 82** (Bruce Bueno and William, Dept. Pol. Sci.—Rochester, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation”, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 302-303)

One might object further. Conceding that the likelihood of miscalculation does diminish as proliferation occurs, one might still contend that the costs of such a miscalculation are so large that they cannot conceivably justify even the diminished risk of war. If the expected costs from nuclear wars arising out of miscalculation or irrational acts exceed the expected costs from wars that could be prevented by proliferation, then, indeed, proliferation is a very dangerous thing. There is, of course, no precise way to measure these expected costs, but we do have some basis for estimating them. Using expected utility calculations similar to the one suggested here, one of us (Bueno de Mesquita 1981b) found that 65 of approximately 70,000 opportunities to initiate war rationally were seized in the period 1816 to 1974, with hundreds of other opportunities being used to threaten war. In that same study it was also found that only 11 of nearly 500,000 opportunities to initiate war were seized in violation of the expectations arising from the expected utility framework. In other words, the ratio of seemingly rational and correct calculations to either irrational calculations or miscalculations that have led to war is over 40 to 1. This implies that through symmetry-producing nuclear proliferation, we may expect to prevent approximately 40 conventional or one-sided nuclear wars for every one miscalculated or irrational bilateral nuclear exchange. Using the 40 most recent wars as a crude indicator, this analysis implies that a single miscalculated or irrational nuclear exchange in the third world would have to kill several tens of millions of people before some proliferation would be unjustified by yielding a higher expected loss of life. It seems to us unlikely that one such miscalculated or irrational act among third world countries, each with a very few warheads, could produce this level of loss. Still, we do not rule it out, but rather note that it is exactly such estimates that must be made in calculating the trade-offs between gains and losses from nuclear proliferation. One might expect, for instance, that selection of candidates for proliferation might be based partially on the calculation of the marginal effect on expected costs in life and property from not standing in the way of the candidate in question. Thus, proliferation would be resisted where the expected marginal effect would be an increase in loss of life and property over nonproliferation, but would be encouraged where the marginal effect was otherwise.

**Deterrence is predicated on the most basic capability for cost-benefit analysis and fear – not rationality**

Kenneth **Waltz**, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 20**03** [“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed”]

Second, Sagan and others use the term "deterrence theory" or even "rational deterrence theory" Deterrence is not a theory. Instead, deterrent policies derive from structural theory, which emphasizes that the units of an international-political system must tend to their own security as best they can. The means available for doing so shape the policies of states and, when nuclear weapons become available, lead them to take deterrent stances even though they may still talk about the need to be able to defend and to fight for their nations' security. In applying theories, one considers salient conditions in the world, and nothing is more salient than nuclear weapons. Moreover, deterrence does not rest on rationality, whatever that term might mean. By a simple definition, one is rational if one is able to reason. A little reasoning leads to the conclusions that to fight nuclear wars is impossible and that to launch an offensive that might prompt nuclear retaliation **is obvious folly**.44 To reach those conclusions, complicated calculations are not required, only a little common sense. Deterrence does not depend on rationality. It depends on fear. To create fear, nuclear weapons are the best possible means.

**More evidence – international complexity proves and other things solve**

**Preble 12** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ

Kagan returns to both this theme and Adams’s quote in *The World America Made*. America’s conception of itself as the reluctant sheriff, unwilling to go out in search of trouble but willing to defend the town only when called upon, “bears no relation to reality,” he explains. “Americans have used force dozens of times, and rarely because they had no choice.” But the world is too complex to be policed by a single global sheriff, and it need not be. Instead, the many beneficiaries of the current order should contribute to the preservation of that order at a level, and in a manner, that is consistent with their interests. By that standard, the United States would retain military power that was at least three or four times greater than that of its closest rivals, but it would no longer presume to be responsible for countries that can take care of themselves. Americans must learn to embrace their relative security and face down their lingering fears. Until they do so, the fear of the unknown works in Kagan’s favor. It is difficult to disentangle the many different factors that have contributed to relative peace and security over the past half century, and it is impossible to know what would have happened in a world without America. The future is even more inscrutable. In this latest book, Kagan surveys all the explanations for what may have contributed to global peace and prosperity—including the spread of democracy, liberal economics, nuclear weapons, and evolving global norms against violence and war—and returns to his refrain from sixteen years earlier. “American hegemony,” he and Kristol wrote in 1996, “is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order.” Fast-forward to 2012, and nothing, it seems, has changed: *There can be no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace. . . . If the United States begins to look like a less reliable defender of the present order, that order will begin to unravel.* He didn’t prove that case before, and he doesn’t now.

**Decline is smooth**

**Preble 12** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ

The world is both more complicated and more durable than Kagan imagines. The United States does not need to police the globe in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations would envy. Neither does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human rights hinge on U.S. power, contrary to Kagan’s assertions. Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable allies against threats they are capable of handling on their own. Americans should not fear power in the hands of others, particularly those countries and peoples that share common interests and values. Finally, precisely because the United States is so secure, it is difficult to sustain public support for global engagement without resorting to fearmongering and threat inflation. Indeed, when Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nation’s power relative to others and shown how U.S. foreign policy has contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national security—the very state of affairs that Kagan celebrates—they grow even less supportive.

**No impact to heg**

**Maher 11**---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

# Case – Coop

**Terrorists aren’t pursuing nukes**

**Wolfe 12 –** Alan Wolfe is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. He is also a Senior Fellow with the World Policy Institute at the New School University in New York. A contributing editor of The New Republic, The Wilson Quarterly, Commonwealth Magazine, and In Character, Professor Wolfe writes often for those publications as well as for Commonweal, The New York Times, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, The Washington Post, and other magazines and newspapers. March 27, 2012, "Fixated by “Nuclear Terror” or Just Paranoia?" [http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-“nuclear-terror”-or-just-paranoia-2/](http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-)

If one were to read the most recent unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions, it does have a section on CBRN terrorism (note, not WMD terrorism). The intelligence community has a very toned down statement that says “several terrorist groups … probably remain interested in [CBRN] capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. … mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins.” They’re talking about terrorists getting industrial chemicals and making ricin toxin, not nuclear weapons. And yes, Ms. Squassoni, it is primarily al Qaeda that the U.S. government worries about, no one else. The trend of worldwide terrorism continues to remain in the realm of conventional attacks. In 2010, there were more than 11,500 terrorist attacks, affecting about 50,000 victims including almost 13,200 deaths. None of them were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009, none were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008, none were caused by CBRN hazards.

**Ayson concludes low probability**

**Mullford 12** (Ally Mullford, staff writer at Media Works NZ, quoting Robert Ayson, 3-28-12, “Nuclear Terrorism Unlikely – Expert,” http://www.3news.co.nz/Nuclear-terrorism-unlikely---expert/tabid/417/articleID/248348/Default.aspx) gz

Prime Minister John Key is due back in New Zealand this morning after meeting with world leaders in Seoul for the second nuclear security summit. International relations expert Robert Ayson joined *Firstline* this morning to discuss the international nuclear situation, and how vulnerable New Zealand is to a nuclear threat. Mr Ayson says while US president Barack Obama spoke at the summit about the possible threat of terrorist groups obtaining nuclear material, the “likelihood [of this happening] is still a fairly small one”. “There have been in the past some groups which have shown a bit of interest in gaining access, but their capacity to actually get a bomb and use it is pretty small,” he says. Mr Ayson says if a terrorist group was to gain access to nuclear material this would be statistically most likely to occur in the former Soviet Union, due to historical large-scale nuclear enterprise in the area. “If there was going to be a statistical probability of terrorists getting access to nuclear materials… it might well happen in the former Soviet Union, and there have been attempts to recentralise all that [nuclear] material back to Moscow for quite some years.” Mr Obama indicated America may further reduce its nuclear arsenal, Mr Ayson says, which would be a “controversial” action taken “in the hope that other countries would follow the lead”. He says while America and Russia have decreased the size of their nuclear arsenals, worldwide disarmament is unlikely without a large-scale nuclear event. “Most of the existing nuclear weapon states still seem to want to hang onto their weapons for one reason or another,” he says. “I think it would take quite a severe disaster… for the world community to be so united and so determined that it would get rid of these weapons.”

**Their authors are biased**

**BBC 8** Monitoring South Asia, 2/29/l/n

The grossly exaggerated threat of nuclear terrorism together with the hype created against Pakistan's nuclear assets, and labelling it a potential threat to the international security, is a singular achievement of the "terrorism industry" that mainly comprises, the US politicians as lead players alongside bureaucrats and the US media. According to a report in USA Today, the US market was expected to generate 29.1bn dollars in 2006 from the "threat of terror," and the US companies were expected to receive nearly all of it. No wonder an impressive number of top-ranking Homeland Security officials abandoned public service to serve the public by working and lobbying for such entrepreneurial firms, where they are offered huge salaries to maintain the momentum of the threat of "terrorism."